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Abstract
This paper analyzes polluters’ incentives to move from a traditional
command and control (CAC) environmental regulatory regime to a
tradable permits (TPP) regime. Existing work in environmental eco-
nomics does not model how firms contest and bargain over actual reg-
ulatory implementation in CAC regimes, and therefore fail to compare
TPP regimes with any CAC regime that is actually observed. This pa-
per models CAC environmental regulation as a bargaining game over
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Workshop at the University of Chicago and the Agricultural and Resource Economics
Department Colloquium at the University of Arizona. Doug Lichtman and Dean Lueck
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pollution entitlements. Using a reduced form model of the regulatory
contest, it shows that CAC regulatory bargaining likely generates a
regulatory status quo under which firms with the highest compliance
costs bargain for the smallest pollution reductions, or even no reduc-
tion at all. As for a tradable permits regime, it is shown that all firms
are better off under such a regime than they would be under an ideal-
ized CAC regime that set and enforced a uniform pollution standard,
but permit sellers (low compliance cost firms) may actually be bet-
ter off under a TPP regime with relaxed aggregate pollution levels.
Most importantly, because high cost firms (or facilities) are the most
weakly regulated in the equilibrium under negotiated or bargained
CAC regimes, they may be net losers in a proposed move to a TPP
regime. When equilibrium costs under a TPP regime are compared
with equilibrium costs under a status quo CAC regime, several other-
wise paradoxical aspects of firm attitudes toward TPP-type reforms
can be explained. In particular, the otherwise paradoxical pattern of
allowances awarded under Phase II of the 1990 Clean Air Act’s acid
rain program, a pattern tending to favor (in Phase II) cleaner, newer
generating units, is explained by the fact that under the status quo
regime, a kind of bargained CAC, it was the newer cleaner units that
were regulated, and which therefore had higher marginal control costs
than did the largely unregulated older, plants. As a normative matter,
the analysis here implies that the proper baseline for evaluating TPP
regimes such as those contained in the Bush Administration’s recent
Clear Skies initiative is not idealized, but nonexistent CAC regula-
tory outcomes, but rather the outcomes that have resulted from the
bargaining game set up by CAC laws and regulations.
1 Introduction
For over three decades, federal, state and local environmental regulators and
the polluting industries that they regulate have been bargaining to reduce
the amount of pollution put into Americas air, water and groundwater. They
have done so pursuant to a set of federal statutes that by and large tell reg-
ulators to base pollution standards on what is technologically and econom-
ically achievable within various industry categories and subcategories. For
decades, this regime which is known as command and control environmen-
tal regulation has been widely decried as inefficient. 1 For an equally long
time, economists have been advocating an alterntive regulatory regime, one
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based on tradeable pollution permits (what I shall refer to as a TPP regime).
TPP regimes set an overall, aggregate cap on the emissions of a particular
pollutant and then allocate that aggregate cap among individual sources of
the pollutant in the form of tradeable pollution permits. There is now a
vast theoretical, empirical and experimental economics literature examining
both positive issues regarding the actual operation of such markets, and nor-
mative questions involving when and whether such market mechanisms may
improve social welfare relative to various benchmarks.2 Indeed, so powerful is
the standard economic argument for TPP regimes that their relative scarcity
in American environmental regulation3 now stands as something of an unex-
plained paradox. However, as shown by the relative success of sulfur dioxide
permit trading under Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act,4 TPP regimes are
more than just a theoretical possibility. TPP regimes have moreover been
proposed recently as an instrument for limiting mercury, NOX and green-
house gas emissions, as well as for controlling nutrient laden wastewaters in
various watersheds.5
Economists have exhaustively analyzed the efficiency of incentives created
by theoretical TPP regimes and, as other contributions to this volume show,
they have also mounted sophisticated and illuminating ex post empirical
analyses of the performance of the one large scale existing TPP regime in the
U.S.(the Title IV acid rain trading program). Left underexplored, however,
has been a very basic question of positive political economy, a question that
is fundamental to explaining when TPP regimes are actually likely to move
from theory to reality: Among polluting firms, who are the winners and
losers in the move from command and control to a TPP regime? When will
the majority of polluting firms support such a move and when will they not?
This article hopes to contribute toward an answer to these questions. In
my view, a major reason why these questions have been neglected in the eco-
nomic literature on TPP regimes is because analysts have generally worked
with a highly oversimplified and unrealistic notion of what command and
control regulation actually means for polluting firms.6 To understand this,
one must understand not only a bit of the stylized history of late twentieth
century American Environmentalism, but also the relatively arcane and com-
plex world of the regulatory system that Environmentalism created. Both
the legislative birth and regulatory elaboration of command and control pol-
lution laws have clear and powerful political - economic explanations. I begin
therefore with some general positive observations regarding the evolution of
command and control environmental regulation in the United States, and
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a brief but relatively detailed look at how laws and regulation have in fact
shaped the command and control regulatory bargaining process.
I then develop a more formal analysis of the command and control reg-
ulatory bargaining process. While highly simplified, the model captures an
important feature of regulatory bargaining: Whether through the initial (fed-
eral level) regulatory categorization process, or in bargaining with state and
local permitting authorities, the higher is a firm’s regulatory compliance
cost, the more the firm has at stake in the regulatory game, and therefore
the greater the resources that the firm will devote to fighting regulation and
the lower is the actual regulatory burden imposed. The model predicts the
widely observed but otherwise paradoxical phenomenon that under command
and control regulation, it is usually those firms that have the highest compli-
ance costs (firms with the oldest and dirtiest plants) who are regulated the
least.
In order to discern winners and losers in a hypothetical transition from
command and control (CAC) to a TPP regime, I compare the equilibrium
distribution of firm costs under alternative versions of command and control
to firm net costs under a TPP regime. Net costs under a TPP regime depend
upon whether a particular firm is a buyer or seller of tradeable permits.
Using a simple model of equilibrium in a TPP market, I show that for a given
pollution reduction standard (permitted level of pollution) implementing that
standard via a TPP regime will make both low and high compliance cost firms
in an industry better off relative to idealized command and control (where
every firm complies with the stated pollution reduction standard). Relative
to equilibrium, firm-specific pollution reduction levels under bargained CAC,
however, moving to a TPP regime is likely to make high compliance cost
firms (permit buyers under TPP) worse off. With this result and others
(such as that firm support for a move to a TPP regime depends upon such
factors as permit demand elasticity and the stringency of the aggregate cap),
the analysis helps explain why polluters sometimes do not support TPP
regimes as well as why they sometimes do. It also suggests that the normative
evaluation of TPP reform proposals should be based on realistic rather than
idealized descriptions of the CAC system being reformed.
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2 The Evolution of Federal Command and
Control Regulation
The social problem underlying modern (that is, late twentieth century) Amer-
ican pollution control regulation was that publicly owned resources such as
air and water were traditionally treated as free public goods, used as waste re-
ceptacles on a first-come-first-served basis. By the late 1960’s, the post World
War II boom in American manufacturing had accomplished two things that
together created a national demand for environmental cleanup and control:
the boom brought mass affluence and dramatic increases in leisure time, thus
generating a new mass demand for outdoor recreation; on the other hand,
so much waste had been put into American airsheds and waterways that
those resources had been pushed to the point where they were either affir-
matively dangerous to health or at the very least unsuitable for precisely the
kinds of outdoor recreation that Americans demanded. On this view, which
I elaborate in considerable detail elsewhere,7 the environmental problems
that modern federal environmental legislation and regulation were designed
to fix were decidedly local. Federal environmental regulation was designed
to improve and protect air, surface water (and later, through RCRA8 and
CERCLA9) groundwater quality so as to benefit people who resided near and
therefore would be benefited most by such improvement and protection.
In other words, federal environmental regulation was designed to provide
local environmental goods. The fact that American industrial polluters had
no common law right to pollute is absolutely crucial in understanding why
American environmental regulation took the form of technology-based com-
mand and control requirements rather than either TPP’s or emission taxes.
From the point of view of beneficiaries from pollution control, the fact that
polluters did not have a common law right to use public resources meant that
polluters could (legally if not as a matter of equilibrium cost distribution) be
made to bear the entire cost of cutting pollution by installing costly pollu-
tion abatement technologies. From the point of view of pollution abatement
beneficiaries, such a system seemed clearly preferable to one in which they
paid polluters to abate their pollution. Of course, giving polluters a limited
statutory right to pollute and making that right tradeable would not have
necessarily entailed a payment to polluters. A system of tradeable rights is,
however, based upon statutorily defined rights. Given that the status quo
regime in a typical American industrial city as of, say 1965, was effectively an
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unlimited right to pollute, moving from the status quo to a regime with very
limited rights to pollute would have entailed enormous costs to American
industry, to American workers and to the industrial heartland communi-
ties where such industries were located. Because the American government
had actively encouraged and even subsidized the creation of the status quo
regime, to drastically switch regimes would not only have been economically
destructive, but in a very real sense unfair.
Rather than a dramatic switch in property rights regimes, the first gener-
ation of American federal environmental statutes attempt a relatively modest
adjustment in rights. Today, the command and control regime created pur-
suant to these statutes is much decried. Such criticism exemplifies hindsight
bias. Much to the contrary, given the level of sunk investments in plant and
production processes and the existing technology that prevailed in the early
1970’s, the first generation federal environmental laws approximate a market
mimicking, value maximizing solution to the problem of pollution reduction.
Although it is true that federal environmental statutes contain language sug-
gesting a goal of zero pollution,10 those statutes are enormously (deliberately)
complex. Read carefully and correctly, statutes such as the Clean Air and
Clean Water Acts tell federal environmental regulators to reduce what had
been an unlimited right to pollute, but to do so subject to the constraint
that the economic and social cost of such reduction not rise to politically
unacceptable levels.11 Unsurprisingly, such a mandate has been translated
into a set of pollution control standards that look at what can be done to
reduce pollution, given existing technological and economic realities. No one
ever thought that these were clear and precise statutory mandates. Indeed,
as I have argued elsewhere, the Congressional interest in environmental as
in other similar regulatory legislation is to clearly endorse consensus goals
while providing substantial discretion to regulators in how to realize those
goals, thus enabling ad hoc Congressional intervention to prevent the reg-
ulatory imposition of politically unacceptable costs.12 Still, as of the early
1970’s, with large and as yet unrealized investments in sunk industrial fa-
cilities, and very little known pollution abatement technology available, the
command and control edict approximates what an informed observer might
well have understood by a “reasonable“ or net value maximizing approach
to the problem of pollution reduction.
By cutting polluters’ entitlements – from free and uncontrolled use of
the air and waterways for waste disposal, to only those levels of disposal
consistent with a reasonable investment in abatement technology – modern
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environmental laws adjusted an analytically inevitable and historically ever-
present bargaining game between polluters and government. Readjusting
entitlements in this way is certainly no less a ”market” response than would
be the imposition of a tax on pollution. Indeed, a command and control reg-
ulatory regime may be understood merely as shifting the focus of bargaining
between polluters and government – away from the magnitude of harm caused
by pollution, which idealized pollution taxes capture - and toward how it is
that polluters must seek to reduce that harm. Indeed, from a traditional
law and economics perspective, the difference between pollution taxes and a
readjustment in pollution entitlements through command and control may
be usefully understood as the difference between a property rights approach
under command and control versus a liability rule approach under pollution
taxes.13 The property rights approach taken by command and control reg-
ulation cut back on what had been a relatively clear entitlement to pollute,
limiting polluters’ rights to that level of pollution consistent with statutorily
required abatement efforts. By giving polluters the right to pollute as much
as they wish, but charging them a tax equal to the harm caused by their
pollution, taxes give the public a right to be free of pollution, but do not
allow them to demand reductions in pollution below the levels induced by
pollution taxes. They may thus be understood as recognizing a public right
to be free of pollution, but allowing polluters to infringe that right so long
as they pay the required price.
As a positive matter, it is relatively easy to see why first generation fed-
eral environmental regulation eschewed pollution taxes in favor of command
and control. Pollution taxes might well have seemed attractive to benefi-
ciaries from pollution reduction. Like command and control requirements,
pollution taxes induce a reduction in pollution. Unlike command and con-
trol requirements, they compensate beneficiaries from pollution reduction for
the continuing harm from reduced levels of pollution. Taxes would therefore
seem preferable from a beneficiary point of view. By the same token, how-
ever, pollution taxes increase the cost of pollution control to polluters: in
addition to the cost of reducing pollution that they would incur under a
command and control regime, they also must pay for the harm caused by
pollution that remains after compliance with the standard.14 Moreover, pol-
lution taxes can work only if pollution is effectively monitored. As Stavins
observes in his chapter in this volume,15 such monitoring is now possible
for some pollutants and some industries, but was generally nonexistent when
modern environmental laws were enacted. Monitoring pollution is, moreover,
Johnston, Tradable Pollution Permits
8
a minor problem compared with the problem of determining the magnitude
of the tax. Pollution taxes anticipate the pollution will continue, albeit at re-
duced levels relative to a no-tax world. The economic ideal is to set pollution
taxes equal to the level of actual harm caused by pollution. Monetizing the
actual harm caused by pollution remains a highly imperfect and controversial
process. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, although it is theoretically
possible to understand pollution taxes as recognizing a public entitlement to
be free of pollution but then allowing polluters to take that entitlement pro-
vided they pay compensation, it is equally possible to view pollution taxes as
giving polluters a conditional entitlement to pollute. A fundamental political
goal of late twentieth century American environmentalism was to change the
status quo allocation of property rights, to declare that polluters did not have
a right to pollute but rather the public had a right to be free of pollution,
to move from one property rights regime to another. Inasmuch as pollution
taxes can be interpreted as granting a conditional right to pollute, they were
and remain inconsistent with this structural goal.
3 What is Command and Control?: Some
Examples of the Technology-Based Envi-
ronmental Regulatory Regime
In order to develop a sensible economic model of the regulatory bargaining
game under command and control environmental regulation, it is necessary
to describe, albeit briefly, what command and control regulation actually
looks like. It is important to begin with a clear understanding of the precise
sense in which uniform command and control regulation is uniform. Federal
environmental laws (such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act) that
mandate technology-based regulatory standards do require uniform emissions
reductions, but only for plants or facilities that are in the same industry cat-
egory and which are of the same approximate age. Under the Clean Water
Act, for instance, EPA promulgates five different kinds of technology-based
standards for each of several hundred industry subcategories.16 Each efflu-
ent standard (or effluent guideline, as they are called under the CWA) sets
a ceiling on a particular sort of source of pollution (or class of pollutants).
The ceiling is EPA’s belief – obtained from sampling existing facilities that
have such sources, or independently, through modeling or from abatement
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industry consultants – about the level of emissions reduction that a particu-
lar source category can achieve if they install a particular pollution control
technology. New facilities (those constructed after the promulgation of the
first set of CWA regulations) were required to meet the toughest standard,
one based on the “best available demonstrated control technology.“17 Facil-
ities in existence at the time that the CWA was passed were required to
install the “best practicable control technology currently available by 1977“
(BPT) which in the case of ”conventional pollutants” (such as organic, bio-
logical oxygen demanding and fecal coliform) meant “best conventional pollu-
tant technology“(BCT)18 and for other pollutants meant the “best available
technology economically achievable.“(BAT)19 The CWA instructs EPA to
determine BPT limitations by considering ”the total cost of application of
technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from
such application,” taking into account a variety of factors relating to pro-
duction and effluent control technologies, non-water quality environmental
impacts, and other factors deemed appropriate by EPA.20
In setting BPT and BCT - based emissions limits,21 EPA first determines
for each industry category or subcategory the level of control associated with
the average of the best pollution control performance by exemplary plants
of varying ages, sizes, and production processes. It then does what may
be called a loose categorical (versus facility or source-specific) cost-benefit
analysis.22 Under such an analysis – which is common to statutes mandating
technology-based standards – the agency inquires into the significance of com-
pliance costs as a share of industry total costs, and into whether those costs
could be imposed without causing substantial economic dislocation, meaning
firm closures. On the benefits side, the question for the agency was whether
compliance with the standards would produce substantial progress toward
the CWA’s statutory goal of eliminating pollution discharges.23 Thus while
both the ”best practicable” and ”best conventional” technological standards
require EPA to take compliance costs into account, this is only an indus-
try category basis.24 Even within a given industry category, however, no
two facilities are exactly alike, not only in their physical layout, but also in
the actual efficacy of any given pollution abatement technology.25 Early in
the history of the CWA, industry argued that the statute obligated or at
least permitted EPA to take individual, facility-specific costs and benefits
into account in setting effluent guidelines. The Supreme Court rejected that
argument,26 making it quite clear that EPA is to set technology-based stan-
dards that are indeed uniform within facilities of a given age and industrial
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category.
A very similar regulatory structure pertains under the Clean Air Act. The
Clean Air Act amendments of 1970 gave EPA the job of establishing National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for specific ”criteria” pollutants
in ambient air, but delegated to the states the task of coming up with State
Implementation Plans (SIP’s) that would achieve these standards by specific
deadlines. The original 1970 CAA generally eschewed resort to technology-
based standards, except for new sources of air pollution, for which EPA was
required to establish emissions standards for different categories of pollution
sources based on the ”degree of emission limitation and the percentage re-
duction achievable through application of the best technological system of
continuous emission reduction which (taking into consideration the cost of
achieving such emission reduction, any nonair quality health and environ-
mental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator determines has
been adequately demonstrated.”27 Although the courts interpreted this pro-
vision to approve EPA’s use of a variable standard for reducing sulfur dioxide
emissions from coal burning power plants of between 70 and 90 per cent, de-
pending upon the sulfur content of the fuel being used,28 they also declared
that fuel switching alone was insufficient to satisfy the ”best technological
system” language of the new source performance standard. 29 Thus although
EPA has the statutory authority to subcategorize sources,30 the courts have
upheld EPAs discretion to instead issue uniform standards for broad source
categories.31 Thus in practical effect, EPA has often interpreted new source
performance standards to require some plants to adopt costly but unneces-
sary control technologies.
The federally determined, technology-based standards governing new sources
were an exception to the general approach taken by the 1970 CAA amend-
ments, which was to set national ambient air quality standards and then let
the states figure out how to achieve those standards. Over the period 1970-
1990, however, states consistently failed to achieve the NAAQS by statutory
deadlines, and in many areas of the country, air quality actually worsened. In
reaction, Congress in 1977 and 1990 substantially amended the CAA so that
it is now, like the CWA, a statute that relies primarily upon uniform federal
technology-based standards. In 1977, Congress specified that SIP’s could
allow new major sources of air pollution in nonattainment areas only if the
new polluter met the ”lowest achievable emissions rate”(LAER).32 LAER,
which is generally determined on a case-by-case basis during preconstruc-
tion permit review, is defined by the CAA as the most stringent emission
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limitation contained in regulations applicable to that source, or the most
stringent limitation that is achieved in practice for such source.33 For ex-
isting major sources, the 1977 amendments require that SIP’s ”provide for
the implementation of all reasonably available control measures as expedi-
tiously as is practicable”34 and must in the meantime accomplish ”such re-
ductions in emissions from existing sources in the area as may be obtained
through the adoption, at a minimum, or reasonably available control tech-
nology (RACT).”35 In practice, both LAER and RACT have amounted to
uniform technology-based standards determined by EPA from which SIP’s
cannot generally deviate.36 The 1990 amendments retained these technology-
based standards and added some new ones, such as ”generally achievable
control technology,”37 and ”best available control measures.” 38 Moreover,
the 1990 amendments clearly moved the CAA toward the CWA model by
explicitly requiring permits for air pollution sources covered by the statute.39
For present purposes, the most important thing to see about technology-
based emissions standards that are uniform within industry subcategories
is that the standards are themselves the outcome of an intense bargaining
process between environmental regulators and industry. Under both the
CWA and CAA, EPA determines ”best practicable, ” ”best available” and
”reasonably available” technologies by securing technical analyses from engi-
neering and economic consultants who sample actual industry practices and
pilot projects. EPA’s studies are then critiqued by industry during (and
even before) the notice and comment period. The process of promulgating
technology-based standards is a long, costly battle between industry and
EPA over issues regarding the cost and effectiveness of a particular technol-
ogy, and how these vary with facility type, and how these variations go into
the initial decision of how to draw industry categories and subcategories.40
Time and time again, industry has persuaded EPA to withdraw proposed
standards by arguing that the standards are either technologically infeasible,
or much less effective than EPA at first thought, so that compliance with
emissions reductions standards predicated on those technologies could only
be achieved at much greater cost than estimated by EPA, so costly that their
adoption would force an unacceptably large number of firms in the industry
into bankruptcy.41
As discussed above, technology-based standards apply to general cate-
gories of sources of regulated pollutants. Examples of regulatory targets un-
der such a system include things such as nitrous oxide emissions from fossil-
fuel burning industrial boilers and electric utility generating units, volatile
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organic compounds emissions from the industrial coating or painting of met-
als and other surfaces, and organic pollutant discharges from pulp and paper
mills. That is to say that the ”sources” of pollution that are actually tar-
geted by a technology-based command and control system are the exhausts
or wastestreams from particular sorts of industrial production processes. Be-
cause these production processes are common to industries or industry sec-
tors, bargaining over initial standard setting takes place between EPA and
the industrial categories that it seeks to regulate.
The end result of this bargaining game is not, however, regulation of
a particular firm. Technology-based standards are not actually binding on
individual firms until they are implemented by state regulators, who write
those standards into source-specific permits under the Clean Water Act, and
into SIP’s (and, more recently, source-specific permits) under the Clean Air
Act.42 At this stage, firms have an incentive again to argue against the
application of the general standard to their particular facility. As mentioned
above, the courts held early on in the history of both the Clean Air Act
and Clean Water Act that uniform technology-based standards are precisely
that, and that neither EPA nor state regulators are to consider the particular
costs and benefits from having one firm versus another comply with the
uniform standards. There is, however, considerable evidence which suggests
that firms actively contest the terms of source-specific permits, as well as the
enforcement of those permits against them. In one EPA region, for example,
37 per cent of initial Clean Water Act permits were contested, with over half
the challenges resulting in permit modifications that went in favor of the
polluting firm.43
Both the CAA and CWA, moreover, tend to encourage such source-
specific contests by including specific provisions allowing source-specific vari-
ances from the otherwise uniform emissions standards. The CWA specifies
that where meeting the best available technology (BAT) standard poses se-
vere economic consequences for an individual facility, a § 301(c) variance
can be granted.44 Although the 1970 CWA did not explicitly authorize vari-
ances from BPT standards, EPA allowed them for existing sources who are
able to persuade permitting authorities that the industrial process, control
technology, costs, or energy considerations applicable to a specific plant are
”fundamentally different” from those used in setting the uniform limitations.
45 After the Supreme Court upheld such variances (as well as EPA’s view
that the mere fact a particular plant has above average costs of complying
with BPT standards does not make it ”fundamentally different”), 46 Congress
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specifically approved this practice in amending the CWA.47 Although cur-
rent academic wisdom has it that such variances are of little practical sig-
nificance,48 such wisdom is based on the fact that only about 60 variance
requests had been submitted to EPA headquarters as of 1985.49 Not only
does the number understate the total number of variance requests submitted
to states and EPA regions50, but it also fails to recognize that the availabil-
ity of a potential variance will often effect the decisions made by a state
permitting authority even when no formal variance request is filed.
More generally, the history of the CWA’s technology-based standards was
not one of successive tightening to keep up with new technology, but rather
one of a series of successful efforts by particular polluters and particular
industries to persuade the agency and/or Congress that their situation was
atypical and justified relaxing rather than tightening the technology-based
standard.51
As a legal matter, source-specific variances under the CAA are more
complex than under the CWA. The EPA defines a variance under the CAA
as a ”temporary deferral of a final compliance date for an individual source
subject to an approved regulation, or a temporary change to an approved reg-
ulation as it applies to an individual source.”52 The language of the statute
itself, however, allows the EPA to approve exemptions of sources from com-
pliance with SIP’s only under very limited circumstances.53 As interpreted
by the Supreme Court and EPA, a source-specific variance granted by a state
can only be recognized by EPA if it is submitted to EPA as revision of the
state’s SIP.54 EPA, moreover, has traditionally required states to produce
very costly and time consuming emissions modeling data before it would ap-
prove such revisions.55 The 1990 amendments to the CAA did nothing to
upset such rules, requiring the any SIP revision submitted as a revision to a
RACT-based control requirement in an SIP achieve the same overall level of
emissions reductions as would be achieved under the RACT standard. 56 As
before 1990, it seems that EPA will only approve source-specific variances if
the state seeking such a variance produces costly modeling data showing that
the variance will not produce a net increase in emissions.57 Since such an
increase is the point of granting a variance, it is generally pointless for states
to make such an attempt to get EPA to approve source-specific variances as
SIP revisions.
Does this mean that firms facing very high costs of complying with the
CAA’s technology-based standards (or for whom compliance is simply not
technically feasible) have given up and simply incurred the costs or closed
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down? Perhaps some have, but local air quality regulators and EPA have
generally found ways to get around the legal impediments to SIP revisions
and succeed in granting variances. In at least one instance, EPA has approved
an SIP that gives the discretion to local regulators to approve alternate com-
pliance methods proposed by companies (so that approving such methods
does not require revising the SIP). 58 In California, which has thirty-four
air quality districts, hearing boards in each district decide variance requests
under a set of rules established by statute statute.59 Given a showing that
the company requesting the variance is a ”good” actor, and is attempting
to minimize the pollution, such hearing boards routinely grant variances on
the ground that the cost to the company of meeting a local RACT-based
standard is large, or would even cause the company to shut down, while
the emissions increase involved in granting the variance is relatively minor.60
Even though they would generally not meet with EPA approval if submitted
as SIP revisions,61 around 1200 such variances (mostly for VOC emissions)
were granted in California each year during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s.62
Individual case studies of the variance process would be of great interest,
but are rare. Those that do exist indicate suggest that while variances are
sometimes granted to firms that have made every effort to comply with the
existing standard but face insuperable technological obstacles to so doing (so
great that they would shut down rather than comply), in other cases they
have been granted to firms that are important local employers but have made
little or no effort to comply.63
Even if facility-specific compliance costs are not grounds for granting a
variance, such costs can be considered at the regulatory enforcement stage.
Indeed, early in the judicial interpretation of the CAA, the Supreme Court
held that while assertions of technological or economic infeasibility were ir-
relevant in the EPA’s determination of NAAQS, it was appropriate for reg-
ulators to consider them in fashioning compliance orders for noncomplying
firms. 64
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4 Alternative Models of Command and Con-
trol Regulatory Standards
4.1 The Regulatory Contest Summarized
The bargaining game generated by the system of technology-based standards
described in the previous section has the following key features:
i) Because emissions standards apply to categories of point sources of
pollution that are typically within the same industry group or sub-group,
bargaining over such standards involves EPA bargaining with both individual
firms within such categories and trade groups that represent such industries;
ii) Entitlements in bargaining over emissions standards are blurry, uncer-
tain and categorical, versus individual. Thus EPA is allowed to consider, and
firms to argue, that the economic costs and dislocations to local economies
will be high, and the corresponding reduction in pollution low, but only rel-
ative to the regulatory category as whole. Typical of the issues that arise in
this persuasion game are: What proportion of firms in the industry will go
out of business if they are required to meet the proposed standards? How
much will firm costs increase, on average across the industry or source cate-
gory, if the proposed standards are implemented? What will be the average
emission reduction achieved by firms if they install the technology that pro-
vides the basis for the standard? Are better alternative approaches available,
and if so, at what cost?
iii) Industry or source-wide standards are not actually effective until im-
plemented and enforced by state and local regulators. At the implementation
and enforcement stage, bargaining is primarily between state and local regu-
lators and individual firms. While the law does not generally allow regulators
to take the uniform, categorical standards and craft them into particularized
requirements that are designed to reflect the costs and benefits from the
standard at a particular plant or facility, state and local regulators are sensi-
tive to such costs and benefits, and will exercise their discretion by allowing
varying amounts of time for firms to comply with the uniform standards and,
even more importantly, by generally eschewing rigid enforcement in favor of
negotiation toward compliance.
Under uniform, categorical technology-based emissions standards, such
bargaining effects not only the emissions standard that is set for a given
industrial category, but the categorization scheme. Although facilities per-
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forming a particular industrial operation may seem very similar to a layper-
son, they often are quite different from a technical or engineering point of
view, and these differences can cause large differences in their actual cost of
achieving a given emissions reduction standard. Two metal finishing shops,
for example, may both anodize aluminum for surface coating. Wastewater
from such anodizing shops contains aluminum and sulfate, and both can be
precipitated out by using a lime slurry. However, if other metals are present in
the wastewater, introduced, for example, in electrolytic coloring baths, then
there will often be a trade-off between precipitating out these metals and
aluminum: to get the other metals out, less aluminum can be eliminated.65
Thus if one of the metal finishing shops is coloring its anodized aluminum
while the other is not, then the shop doing the coloring will have a higher cost
of meeting any given aluminum effluent reduction requirement. Variations in
plant size and operating levels also generate variations in compliance costs.
There are a number of different ways for plants to remove particulate air pol-
lutants from their airborne waste streams, including mechanical collectors,
fabric filters, wet scrubbers and electrostatic precipitators.66 The efficiency
of these various methods of removing particulates depends upon the level
at which they are operated (the flow of particulates), with efficiency falling
off for many types of equipment when operations fall above or below design
capacity.67 Somewhat more simply, a coal burning electric utility generating
plants cost of reducing its sulphur dioxide emissions depends upon its loca-
tion relative to sources of low sulphur coal.68 Plants that have cheap access
to low sulphur coal can reduce sulphur dioxide emissions more cheaply than
can plants for whom such coal is more expensive and for whom scrubbers are
actually cost-minimizing.
In virtually any industry, production facilities vary so much in age, de-
sign, operation rates, raw material composition and transportation and other
costs that few if any have precisely the same cost of achieving a given level
of reduction in pollution. For this reason, when EPA bargains with indus-
try over uniform, categorical emission standards, it typically faces arguments
to the effect that certain kinds of plants are in fact so dissimilar that they
should be categorized differently. More precisely, because any given pollu-
tion reduction technology achieves different levels of pollution reduction in
different plants, it will often (perhaps usually) be true that lots of plants
will not be able to achieve the average level of emissions reduction that EPA
finds from its sample of facilities employing the technology. For these plants,
the actual cost of achieving the targeted emissions reduction will be much
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higher than for the average, sampled facility. Companies owning such high
cost plants have every incentive to argue to EPA that their plants should
actually be recategorized in a different (regulatory, if not product market)
industry. As indicated by the large number of categories and sub-categories
created by EPA under statutes such as the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts,
those arguments often meet with success.
iii) However the categories are ultimately drawn, categorical standards
are not actually effective until implemented and enforced in facility-specific
permits written by state and local regulators. At the implementation and
enforcement stage, bargaining is primarily between state and local regulators
and individual firms. While the law does not generally allow regulators to
take the uniform, categorical standards and craft them into particularized
requirements that are designed to reflect the costs and benefits from the
standard at a particular plant or facility, state and local regulators are sensi-
tive to such costs and benefits, and will exercise their discretion by allowing
varying amounts of time for firms to comply with the uniform standards and,
even more importantly, by generally eschewing rigid enforcement in favor of
negotiation toward compliance.
4.2 Formalizing Alternative Versions of Command and
Control
With so many stages – beginning with lobbying over the initial promulgation
and finalization of a regulation, continuing through challenges to the regu-
lation in court, and ending with bargaining over the actual implementation
and enforcement of a regulation – it is perhaps unsurprising that environ-
mental economists have failed to develop formal models of how command
and control regulation actually works. That is, they have been quick to
argue that because environmental regulators lack the information to craft
emissions standards accurately reflecting facility-specific costs and benefits,
incentive-based alternatives to command and control such as TPP regimes
are likely to be more efficient than command and control.69 But they have
not attempted a formal specification of command and control that would
allow more realistic comparison with outcomes under such incentive-based
regimes.70
In the absence of any existing, canonical formal specification, I consider
instead two contrasting versions of command and control: Idealized and Bar-
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gained.
4.2.1 Idealized Command and Control
Under what I call Idealized command and control, the regulation requires
all firms to abate their pollution from a status quo of one unit down a level
x ∈ (0, 1). Hence the cost to the ith firm of complying with such a pollution
reduction standard is given by (1 − x)ci. Under Idealized command and
control, the regulatory standard is costlessly and perfectly enforced, and with
such a high sanction for noncompliance, F , that every firm finds it cheaper
to comply than to incur the sanction.
4.2.2 Bargained Command and Control
To formalize Bargained command and control, I adapt a simplified version
of a model developed by Montero.71 In this model, there is a continuum
of firms, of mass equal to 1, each of which emits one unit of a uniform
pollutant. Firms vary according to their (constant) marginal cost of abating
this one unit of pollution, and the distribution of firm (constant marginal)
abatement cost c is given by the continuous density function g(c) defined
on [c, c̄], with cumulative distribution function G(c). Given its knowledge
of this distribution function, the regulator can infer the aggregate industry
abatement cost curve C(q) for 0 ≤ q ≤ 1.72
Under bargained command and control, firms do not automatically com-
ply with a regulation requiring pollution to be reduced in the amount (1−x).
Rather, assuming still that the fine for noncompliance, F , is so high that
firms would never simply fail to comply and acquiesce in paying the fine,
they choose instead between complying and fighting the regulation. That is,
in bargained command and control, there is a chance that by fighting the
regulation – playing the regulatory game – the firm will either get its plant
recategorized into a different (and less stringently regulated) category, or
else obtain a variance or some other plant-specific relief. Now the regulatory
game obviously has several stages, and a complete analysis of outcomes in
that game can only be done within the context of a sequential bargaining
model.73 There are, however, a number of very general features of equilib-
ria in such games that can be seen even within a very simple, reduced form
model.
The following is a fairly general version of such a model. To simplify the
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regulatory game, I assume that it is a complete information game played by
a risk neutral regulator and firm, and I restrict attention to subgame perfect
equilibria. In the regulatory game, the firm chooses whether to comply or
contest the regulation. If it contests the regulation, then the firm and the
government simultaneously choose how much to invest in the contest – their
effort levels – and these effort levels are the sole determinant of the outcome
of the contest. (Thus the restriction to subgame perfect equilibria means that
a firm will engage in the regulatory contest only if its expected total cost from
the contest is less than the cost of compliance.) To sharpen the basic result,
I assume that if the firm wins the regulatory game, it is not regulated at
all. Let the probability that the firm wins the regulatory contest (and is not
regulated) be given by q(ei, eg) where ei is the firm’ s effort level in the conflict
and eg is the government’ s effort level in the conflict. Assume that effort has
unit cost, and assume further that q1 < 0, q11 > 0, q2 < 0, q22 > 0; that is,
both the firm and government have declining marginal productivity of effort.
I assume also that the regulatory contest function is perfectly symmetric, in
that q(ei, eg) = 1− q(eg, ei).74
Now taking the government’s effort level as fixed (the Cournot assump-
tion), a firm with compliance cost ci chooses its effort level ei to solve:
min
ei
q(ei, eg)ei + [1− q(ei, eg)](ei + ci + F ) (1)
The first order condition to this problem (which exists, by the assump-
tions made above), ei is defined by:
q1(ei∗, eg) =
1
ci + F
(2)
From equation (2), it follows immediately that (provided the firm s reser-
vation profit constraint is satisfied) the higher is ci ,the firm s marginal cost
of compliance, the higher will be optimal effort level in the regulatory game,
ei∗.
Now consider the government regulator. Suppose that the regulator per-
ceives a benefit B(1 − x) from eliminating an amount x of pollution, with
dB/d(1 − x) > 0, so that dB/dx < 0.75 That is, the regulator’ s benefit in-
creases as the required level of pollution reduction increases (the permitted
level of pollution falls.)
The government’s objective in the regulatory game is to choose eg so as
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to:
max
eg
[1− q(ei∗, eg)](B(1− x)− eg))− q(ei∗, eg)eg (3)
The first order condition defining the interior solution eg∗ to this problem
is given by:
q2(ei, eg∗) =
−1
B(1− x)
. (4)
As q22 > 0 by assumption, ∂eg∗/∂B > 0; that is, the government’ s
optimal effort level increases with its benefit.
For a given pollution standard xs, let the net expected payoffs to the
government regulator and to the firm (net, that is, of effort cost) from the
regulatory game be denoted respectively by:
Rg(xs) = [1− q(ei∗, eg∗)]B(1− xs)− eg∗, and (5)
Ri(xs) = [1− q(ei∗, eg∗)](ci(1− xs)) + F ) + ei∗ (6)
Several observations may now be made regarding the regulatory contest.
1. As a general matter, as in any complete information game of conflict,
the firm and the government are both better off negotiating and settling
rather than actually fighting the regulatory contest. The reason is that by
settling, they both save the expenditure on contest effort that they would
have made were the contest not averted. From the government’ s point of
view, the continuity of the benefit function B(1 − x) means that there is
always some level of negotiated pollution reduction, xi such that B(1−xi) =
Rg(xs). The analogous result holds for the firm. Provided that Rg(xs) <
Ri(xs), that is, provided that the government’ s net expected benefit from
the regulatory game is less than the firm’ s expected total cost from the
regulatory game, there will always be a negotiated firm-specific pollution
reduction xi that makes both the firm and the government better off relative
to their expected payoffs from a regulatory contest.
2. However, unlike private litigation – where the defendant’ s loss at
trial equals the plaintiff’ s gain – the stakes in the regulatory contest are
generally unequal. For this reason, we cannot be sure unambiguously that
there is room for settlement in the regulatory contest. Indeed, there are two
general cases.
i) When the government has much more at stake in the contest than
does the firm, (the regulatory benefit of winning, B(1− x), is much greater
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than the private cost of losing, ci + F ), then there will be no agreed level
of compliance that makes both parties better off than they are (in expected
value terms) contesting over the standard xs. If the contest ensues, then
by the first order conditions (2) and (4) above, the government will expend
much more effort than will the firm, leading to a low probability of firm
success q. Thus when the firm has a low compliance cost ci, it will probably
lose the regulatory contest, and will probably be better off simply complying
than contesting the regulation. Quite differently, a low fine, F , can be seen
to have a somewhat paradoxical effect: ceterus paribus, a low fine induces
a lower level of firm effort in the regulatory contest, increasing the expected
regulatory payoff from such a contest. By keeping fines low, the government
lessens firm incentives to fight regulation.
ii) As the firm’ s cost of compliance ci increases (holding B(1 − x) con-
stant), it will eventually be the case that Rg(xs) < Ri(xs), so that a negoti-
ated, firm-specific pollution reduction will typically make both parties better
off than they would be (in expected value terms) if they proceed with the
contest. Moreover, because of my symmetry assumption on q() and on effort
costs, when ci + F >> B(1 − x), it will also be the case that eg∗ << ei∗
and that ∂eg∗/∂ei∗ < 0.
76 When the firm has a lot more at stake than the
government, it puts a lot more effort into the regulatory contest, and when
this is true of relative effort levels, the government’s optimal effort level is
actually falling in the firm’s optimal effort level.77
3. Another way to put the last fact is that the higher is the firm’s com-
pliance cost, the bigger is the firm’s expected cost in the regulatory contest
– (Ri(xs) – but also the lower is the government’s expected payoff from the
contest – Rg(xs). While the precise bargaining solution varies, of course,
with the relative bargaining power of the firm and the regulator, it is likely
that as the firm’s compliance cost increases, its impact in driving down the
government’s expected payoff from the contest will be the dominant effect
on settlement.78 If this is so, then the negotiated firm-specific pollution re-
duction that the government will demand in lieu of fighting the regulatory
contest will be lower, the higher is the firm’s compliance cost.
4. It follows directly that for sufficiently high firm compliance cost ci, the
government’s expected return from the regulatory contest will be negative
for all eg∗(ci) > 0, and so the government no longer has a credible threat to
regulate, and firms with such high compliance cost are not required to reduce
their pollution.79
5. The rational regulator’s expected benefit – either from the regulatory
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contest or via a regulatory settlement – does not necessarily increase mono-
tonically with (1− xs), the pollution reduction standard. As can be seen by
totally differentiating (3) with respect to x, the indirect effect of increasing
(1 − xs) in inducing more firm effort in the regulatory contest can actually
cause the government’s expected payoff to begin to fall with such increases.
6. It may seem unreasonable to suppose that the regulator and firm
engage in the bargaining game with complete information about each other’s
payoffs (that is, with the firm knowing B(1− x) and the regulator knowing
ci). While a full analysis of the incomplete information case is beyond the
scope of the present chapter, the usual effect of incomplete information about
payoffs in making settlement less likely may not be a severe problem in the
regulatory contest context. For instance, if the regulator knows only the
average firm compliance cost µ = E[ci], then provided that fighting the
contest is credible for the average firm and for the regulator given the average
firm’s effort investment, it might seem that even firms with above average
costs (and optimal contest effort levels) may end up engaging in the contest,
because they cannot find a way to credibly persuade the regulator that their
investment will be so high that the regulator is better off settling for a lower,
firm-specific pollution reduction. But in such a case, firms actually have an
incentive to reveal information to the regulator, in that both will be better
off if the conflict is avoided. Of course, incentives are not perfectly aligned,
since firms have an incentive to overstate their costs so as to get as small
a bargained, firm-specific pollution reduction as possible. Still, the shared
interest in avoiding a costly regulatory conflict does create an incentive to
share at least some information.
This relatively foregoing formal analysis of bargained command and con-
trol may be summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For a given formal regulatory pollution standard xs, when
firms can contest regulation, and both the firm and the regulator optimally
choose efforts levels in the contest with full information regarding each other’
s payoffs and settlement is possible, the likely regulatory outcome is one in
which: a) firms with compliance cost ci below a cutoff value cl comply and
do not contest the regulation; b) firms with compliance costs ci such that
cl ≤ ci ≤ ch settle with the regulator for a firm-specific pollution level xi > xs;
and, c) firms with compliance costs ci > ch are not regulated and do not reduce
pollution, where ch is defined by Rg(xs; ch) = 0.
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5 TPP Programs as both a Result, and In-
creasingly Important Solution to the Patholo-
gies of Categorical,Technology Based Fed-
eral Environmental Standards
5.1 Why are there any TPP Programs?
That TPP programs were not included in first generation American envi-
ronmental regulation is hardly surprising. Before creating markets in enti-
tlements to pollute, those entitlements had to be created in the first place.
Given that the status quo was a right to pollute and that reductions in pol-
lution typically involved large sunk investments (in secondary wastewater
treatment, end-of-stack scrubbers, and similar equipment), new entitlements
were worked out only through a long and costly negotiation process involving
literally thousands of lawsuits. To the extent that new entitlements were ac-
tually negotiated, they took the form of the technology-based standards that
I have described in some detail above. A regulatory regime based upon such
technology-based standards is inherently inconsistent with a TPP regime.
TPP regimes, after all, operate by setting aggregate pollution caps for a par-
ticular pollutant, allocating that aggregate amount of pollution across iden-
tified sources of such pollutant, and then allowing firms to comply either by
reducing the pollution sources they own down to the level of their allocation,
or by buying allocations from other firms. As even their most committed
advocates concede, the effectiveness of a TPP regime, as with any regula-
tory regime, hinges upon effective enforcement enforcement which makes it
cheaper for firms to comply either by buying permits or by reducing pollution
than to fail to comply. Because TPP regimes are output-oriented they do not
regulate how firms get into compliance, but whether they are in compliance
– the effectiveness of TPP regimes hinges upon accurate monitoring of firms
emissions and permit purchases, and upon the assessment of an adequately
severe penalty upon those firms found not to be in compliance.
The existing technology-based command and control system does not
possess the preconditions for successful pollution permit trading. The first
problem is that technology-based standards do not, by their very definition,
require source specific monitoring. Hence cap and trade regimes that are
simply engrafted upon existing technology-based regulations (such as the Re-
Johnston, Tradable Pollution Permits
24
gional Clean Air Incentives Market – RECLAIM – set up for the L.A. basin)
require firms to self-report their emissions. Given that regulators have lim-
ited budgets, and can only audit and (imperfectly) verify a small fraction of
the emissions self-reports, there is an obvious incentive for firms to underre-
port their actual emissions. Critics of existing cap and trade schemes such
as RECLAIM that rely upon self-reporting80 argue that such underreporting
is pervasive.81
There is another much more basic obstacle to engrafting emissions trad-
ing upon the existing technology-based regulatory framework. Even with
limited enforcement resources, the existing command and control regulatory
system has generally been effective in creating an incentive for the largest and
most visible firms to come into compliance with existing technology-based
standards. As argued above, however, even if most firms are in compliance
with such standards, there is little if any incentive for firms to go beyond
compliance when operating in such a regulatory environment. Hence while
there may well be firms who are not in compliance and who might be willing
buyers of pollution permits there will not be many firms who have gone
so far beyond existing regulatory requirements that they would have unused
pollution permits that they might sell. That is, if firms are minimizing their
compliance costs under an existing technology-based regulatory regime that
they expect to be relatively stable in the future, then the aggregate level of
emissions will be slightly above what the technology-based standard would
imply (because some firms are out of compliance in equilibrium). A cap and
trade regime which sets the aggregate cap at or below the emissions level
that should be obtaining under the status quo regulatory regime will there-
fore generate lots of firms that would like to buy because they were not
really in compliance, and hence need to buy permits but very few if any who
are willing to sell. Simple economics might seem to teach that lots of buyers
versus only a few sellers means that the price of pollution permits will be very
high. But this is simplistic rather than simple economics. When transaction
costs are high, markets may fail to exist in the first place. Moreover, unlike
most goods, the supply of pollution permits is fixed (by regulators). With a
fixed supply that falls far short of the number of permits demanded, market
equilibrium will involve lots of willing buyers who simply were unable to find
a permit to buy.
This story helps explain the relative failure of EPA’s oldest experiment
with TPP’s, the requirement under the CAA that new major air pollution
sources in nonattainment areas offset new source emissions with decreases
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from an existing source or sources.82 There were thousands of offsets dur-
ing the first ten years of this program (1977-1986), but the vast majority
of these were ”internal” offsets – offsets obtained because a firm that con-
structed a new source of air pollution found a way to reduce pollution at
an existing source that it owned. There were few if any external offsets,
exchanges where the firm building a new source contracted for a reduction
of emissions at some other firm.83 The failure to observe very many offset
trades was due to a number of factors. Notably, without a scheme that first
gives firms credit for ”extra” emissions reductions relative to status quo reg-
ulatory requirements as by allowing them to ”bank” such excess emissions
reductions offset trades across firms are possible only when there is a lucky
coincidence of one firm reducing emissions at the same time another is build-
ing a new source. Given that few states had implemented banking, and that
the status of banked emissions was at best uncertain, the transactions costs
obstacles to the formation of offset markets were even higher than dictated
by the incentives created by the status quo command and control regulatory
regime.84
The difficulty of engrafting trading schemes on existing command and
control regimes also explains why TPP program have sometimes worked.
There are two examples of relatively successful TPP regimes in federal en-
vironmental law and regulation the Title IV Acid Rain trading scheme,
and EPA’s lead phasedown program. These programs are discussed in some
considerable detail in other chapters.85 For present purposes, what is most
notable about each of these programs is that they did not simply involve en-
grafting a tradable permits regime on an existing technology-based system.
Initiated in 1982, EPA’s lead phasedown program allowed gasoline refiners to
trade lead content allowances under an overall cap on lead gasoline additives
that declined to zero over the life of the program.86 The program allowed
unused allowances to be banked for up to three years, and succeeded in en-
couraging an active market in lead allowances. While there were a number
of factors accounting for the programs success as a trading regime such as
its simplicity, relatively small number of participants and the certainty that
banked allowances could indeed be sold87 perhaps the key factor in explain-
ing the programs success was that the overall goal of the program the steady
decline in and eventual elimination of lead additives was clear. Given that
this goal was relatively inexpensive for some firms to meet, while completely
infeasible for others (who went out of business), perhaps the clearest lesson
of the lead phasedown program is that by lowering the cost of achieving an
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ambitious overall emissions reduction goal, trading can make such a goal
politically feasible when it otherwise would not be.
A similar but more extensive illustration of this phenomenon is provided
by the Acid Rain program. Enacted as Title IV of the 1990 amendments to
the CAA,88 set up a stand alone sulfur dioxide cap and trade program apply-
ing (over two phases) to some 800 electricity generating units. That program
sought to achieve a steady reduction in aggregate, nationwide sulfur dioxide
emissions. The accumulating evidence indicates not only that the program
has succeeded, but that it has succeeded both because it allows firms the
flexibility to find the lowest cost way of reducing emissions (installing scrub-
bers, buying low sulfur eastern or western coal), but also because some high
cost of compliance firms have complied by buying emissions permits from
low compliance cost firms.89 That the Title IV program happened at all
was due to perceived breakdown of technology-based regulation as applied
to the electric utility generating industry. Under the differential treatment
of ”old” versus ”new” sources which is typical of such regimes, the CAA’s
acid rain regulations had focused on new power plants while grandfathering
older plants, producing a situation where by 1985, 83 per cent of power plant
sulfur dioxide emissions came from generating units that did not meet that
1971 standards required of new sources. 90 Environmentalists and political
representatives from eastern states perceived as bearing the costs of acid rain
wanted faster and greater reductions in aggregate emissions, and in partic-
ular wanted emissions reductions at the dirtiest facilities. Given the cost to
such facilities of meeting such tough emissions targets, the cap and trade
system emerged as a compromise: the least cost method of achieving overall
emissions standards that were significantly tougher than under the existing
law.91 The the Title IV program did not represent a situation where tradable
permits were engrafted on an existing technology-based system, but rather
a movement from such a system to a relatively pure TPP system in which
firms were given source-specific permits. ”Given” is indeed a misnomer, in
that the statutory allocation of initial Title IV permits reflected a costly
legislative lobbying game.92
5.2 How TPPs Change the Regulatory Bargaining Game
The previous sections discussion of existing TPP programs in American fed-
eral environmental law suggests that while attempts to engraft TPP regimes
on existing technology-standards-based systems have often failed for lack of
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support from industry and others, there are circumstances when such pro-
grams can succeed. The case studies discussed above indeed suggest that
TPP regimes may make it much easier for regulators to impose tougher emis-
sions standards, relative to technology-based standards. This section formal-
izes this intuition. I show that unlike proposals to base emissions standards
on particularized, source-specific, cost-benefit determinations which often
threaten firms with big changes in equilibrium compliance costs that have
big consequences for their relative profitability and competitiveness most
and sometimes even all firms in an industry sector can be better off under
TPP regime than they would be if regulators attempted to achieve the same
level of aggregate emissions using technology-based standards.
Underlying this demonstration is a basic intuition that trading itself may
significantly alter the dynamics of the regulatory bargaining game. The
reason is that whenever firms differ in their costs of meeting a given regulatory
standard by which I mean an emissions target trading will unambiguously
lower the regulatory compliance costs of those firms with the highest such
costs, firms that spend the most in opposing tougher command and control
standards.
5.2.1 Firm Costs under a TPP Regime of Varying Ambition: For-
mal Analysis
To see these points formally, consider again the formal model developed
above. Consider first a tradeable permits regime under which each firm is
given a permit to emit x amount of pollution. Under such a regime, firms can
comply either by incurring the marginal cost c of compliance, or by buying
permits at market price p. I shall assume that tradable permits regime is one
in which firms are required to install an emissions monitoring system that
perfectly informs the regulator as to their emissions level and that regulators
have perfect knowledge of each firms permit buy and sell history. Hence
under the tradeable permits regime, the regulator costlessly obtains perfect
information as to whether each firm is in compliance. As under idealized
regulation, firms that are not in compliance are made to pay a very large fine
F .
The question of interest is how firms equilibrium costs differ under the
command and control versus the tradable permits regimes. To answer this
question, we must solve for the equilibrium under a tradeable permits regime.
And as discussed above, equilibrium cost distribution under a tradeable per-
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mits regime depends upon the market equilibrium, upon which firms will buy
permits and which will sell. To solve for this equilibrium, I simplify by con-
sidering a closed system: one in which only the regulated firms may buy or
sell permits.93 Let p be the equilibrium price of permits. Consider first those
firms with c < p. Because for such firms c < p, they will always be better off
abating fully (the entire 1 unit of pollution) and selling the excess allowance
than abating just down to the allowed level (that is, c(1− x) > c− xp when
p > c.) Such firms are better off fully abating and selling excess permits
than than not complying provided that c− xp < F , which must be true for
a sufficiently high fine.
Now consider firms with c ≥ p. It is cheaper for such firms to buy
permits than to abate and sell (that is, for these firms, c − xp > c(1 − x).)
Such firms are better off buying permits than failing to comply provided that
(1− x)p < F , which once again must hold for sufficiently large fine F .
The market price p is determined by the market equilibrium condition
that supply equals demand:
x
∫ p
c
dG = (1− x)
∫ c
p
dG, or (7)
xG(p) = (1− x)(G(c)−G(p)), which becomes
(1− x) = G(p), so that
p(x) = G−1(1− x). (8)
Using expression (5) for p(x), we have that:
p′(x) =
−1
g(1− x)
< 0 and
d/dx[xp(x)] = p(x)− x
g(1− x)
= G−1(1− x)− xg(1− x) > 0 ⇔
G−1(1− x)
xg(1− x)
= ηd > 1, (9)
where ηd is the elasticity of demand for permits.
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Expressions (8) and (9) have a number of implications for how changes
in the stringency of the cap and trade program affect buyers versus sellers of
permits. Most directly, by (8) a change in x, the initial number of permits
given to each polluter, obviously changes the identity of the marginal buyer
and seller of permits. For non-marginal buyers and sellers, we have the
following:
Result 1
As the number of permits given to polluters, x, increases – as the cap and
trade program becomes relatively less ambitious in its pollution reduction
goal – the price of permits falls and so the net cost of the cap and trade
program to high compliance cost permit buyers falls;
Result 2
For permit sellers, an increase in the number of permits initially given to
each polluter may increase or reduce their net expected cost under the permit
program. Only if the elasticity of permit demand ηd > 1 will an increase in
the number of permits actually reduce the net cost of the cap and trade
program to permit sellers. That is, if demand is elastic, then an increase
in the number of permits for sale has only a small effect in depressing the
permit price, and so net seller revenue increases for non-marginal sellers.
5.2.2 Comparison with Command and Control(CAC)
Letting the CAC pollution standard be denoted simply by x (rather than
xs as earlier), the two stylized versions of command and control developed
earlier generate the following equilibrium outcomes:
Under idealized CAC, all firms reduce by one unit, at cost ci;
Under Bargained CAC, firms with cost ci < cl comply by reducing pollu-
tion down to the standard level xs, while those with ci such that cl < ci ≤ ch
reduce pollution down to a negotiated level xi > x, and those with ci > ch
do not reduce at all.
i) Under Idealized CAC, firms that would be buyers in a cap and trade
program would have costs equal to c(1−x) which must exceed their actual net
cost under cap and trade, given by p(1−x), because these firms are such that
c > p. Likewise, firms with c ≤ p sell permits under cap and trade have a net
cost under that regime of c− xp but would have a net cost of c(1− x) under
the command and control regime, but for c ≤ p, c− xp ≤ c− xc = c(1− x)
and so have lower net costs under cap and trade than under command and
control.
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ii) Under bargained CAC, only firms with ci ≤ ch actually incur compli-
ance costs and reduce pollution. Moreover, under bargained command and
control, firms with ci such that cl ≤ ci ≤ ch reduce pollution not by the full
amount (1 − x), but rather by some amount (1 − xi) with xi > x. Under
the cap and trade regime, only firms with ci < p(x) actually comply by re-
ducing pollution, but firms with ci > p incur costs of (1− x)p to comply by
buying permits. Depending upon the structure of the regulatory conflict -
bargaining game under command and control, it is clearly possible that the
negotiated firm-specific reductions xi and the threshold for no-reduction ch
are such that the majority of firms would actually have higher costs under
the cap and trade regime than they do in the status quo bargained command
and control regime. Especially when firm costs increase more rapidly with a
toughening emissions standard (decreasing xs), than do regulatory benefits,
the actual bargained command and control regime may be one in which fewer
firms incur compliance costs than would incur such costs under the (perfectly
enforced) TPP regime. If something like bargained command and control is
the status quo against which the TPP regime is compared, then the majority
of firms might well oppose a move to TPP.
6 A Positive Implication: Explaining Title
IV Allocations
The general predictions of my model are confirmed by the pattern of Con-
gressional allocations of sulfur dioxide pollution allowances under Title IV
of the 1990 CAA. As observed earlier, the sulfur dioxide allowance trading
program under Title IV of the amended CAA is the most well known, and
most successful TPP program to date. One of the great contributions of
Ellerman et. al. 94 is their detailed explication of the complex Congressional
bargaining process that culminated in the passage of Title IV. Congressional
bargaining focused on the number of allowances that different coal-fired gen-
erating units would be given. That is, Title IV not only set an aggregate
emissions reduction goal, but itself set the number of allowances both for
Phase I, which applied beginning in 1996 to 225 large, dirty generating units
with sulfur dioxide emissions rates above 2.5 pounds of sulfur dioxide per mil-
lion Btu, and for Phase II, which began in 2001 and applied to all generating
units with emissions rates above 1.2 and capacity above 75 megawatts (as of
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1985).95 As Ellerman et. al. show, Congressional allocation of both Phase
I and Phase II allowances departed significantly from the basic apolitical
statutory formula for allocations (which multiplied a unit’s average 1985-87
energy input by a statutory emissions rate, of 2.5 for Phase I units and 1.2 for
Phase II units). Old, high emission plants in high emission states whose fa-
cilities burned local high sulfur coal used their political influence to get extra
Phase I allowances.96 For Phase II, over thirty special allocation rules writ-
ten into the statute generated deviations from the base allocations.97 These
allocation rules effectively made the actual level of allocations received by a
generating unit much more sensitive to variations among types of units than
the baseline allocation formula countenanced. To the surprise of Ellerman
et. al., the actual pattern was the opposite, with the oldest, dirtiest units
penalized, and newer, cleaner units given extra allowances (relative to the
base formula).98 Ellerman et. al., come up with decidedly non-economic, ad
hoc explanations for this pattern, attributing it to a Congressional sense of
fairness – that it would be unfair to require even more of plants that already
relatively clean – or, conversely, to the desire of Congressional representa-
tives from clean coal (or natural) gas burning western states to get revenge
for the costs the dirty coal state representatives had imposed on clean states
in prior versions of the CAA.99
By a very direct extension,100 my model provides a relatively simple eco-
nomic explanation for the pattern of Phase II allowances under Title IV:
differing marginal control costs under the existing, pre-Title IV status quo
regulatory regime. Under the pre-1990 regime, the oldest, dirtiest plants
had been grandfathered out of federal emission rate standards, and were
subject only to widely varying and often lax state regulation under state
implementation plans. New plants were, conversely, subject to tough federal
emission rate standards, plus the politically motivated, redundant scrubber
requirement that was the subject of clean state ire. Under the rather bizarre
pre-1990 status quo command and control regime,101 the newest, cleanest
plants were subject to the toughest emission rate regulations. Unsurpris-
ingly, as found by Ellerman et. al., because they had done little if anything
to reduce their sulfur dioxide emissions, marginal sulfur dioxide control costs
were lowest in old, dirty plants102, whereas they were higher in the cleaner,
newer plants. This status quo regime is precisely what I have called the
regime of bargained command and control, a regime under which the dirtiest
plants have such large costs of meeting the target emissions reductions that
they actually end up being unregulated. Newer, more efficient plants are reg-
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ulated and required to achieve substantial reductions in emission rates. Such
a regulatory regime generates a bargained equilibrium in which the cleanest
plants have already been forced to reduce their emissions, and hence have
higher marginal costs of further reductions than to do the dirtiest plants,
who have been left unregulated. My model explains the otherwise para-
doxical pattern of Title IV Phase II allowances as reflecting opposition to
a simple Title IV regime by owners of clean plants – those who relative to
an equal baseline would have the lowest marginal control costs, but whose
actual, CAC-induced marginal control costs are quite high. That clean units
demanded special additional allowances before their representatives would
sign on to Title IV reflects that fact that they were the ones being most
stringently regulated under the status quo CAC regime.
7 A Normative Implication: The Ideal Ver-
sus the Real in Air Pollution Regulation
Another contribution of the analysis here is to show the significance of taking
the correct baseline in evaluating a move from a CAC regime to a TPP
regime. The significance of baselines is well-illustrated by the recent debate
over the Bush Administration’s Clear Skies inititative. According to the
Administration, Clear Skies generates ”dramatic” reductions in power plant
emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and mercury. According to many
prominent environmental groups, however, the plan’s goal of a 70 per cent
reduction in these emissions by 2018 is too little, and too late in coming.
These groups argue that if existing Clean Air Act regulations were fully
enforced, there would be bigger and quicker reductions in these pollutants
from power plants.103 Such claims are true. But my analysis here suggests
that the relevant comparison is very likely not between the Administration’s
proposed TPP regime and an Idealized CAC regulatory regime, for that
regime clearly does not and has never existed. Rather the relevant normative
question is whether the Administration’s (or any other) proposed TPP regime
is likely to generate lower levels of emissions than the current, real world CAC
regime generates. If what I have called Bargained CAC roughly describes
the current CAC status quo, then it is one in which the oldest and dirtiest
facilities will not actually have to reduce their emissions by very much, if at
all. Compared to such a Bargained regime, the Administration’s proposals
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tend to look far better than they do when compared with an Idealized, but
nonexistent CAC regime.
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103See, for example, Sierra Club, Facts about the Bush Administration’s Plan to Weaken
the Clean Air Act, available at www.sierraclub.org/cleanair/clear skies.asp.
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